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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new simulation platform called Insight, cre-
ated to design and simulate cyber-attacks against large arbi-
trary target scenarios. Insight has surprisingly low hardware
and configuration requirements, while making the simula-
tion a realistic experience from the attacker’s standpoint.
The scenarios include a crowd of simulated actors: network
devices, hardware devices, software applications, protocols,
users, etc.
A novel characteristic of this tool is to simulate vulnerabili-
ties (including 0-days) and exploits, allowing an attacker to
compromise machines and use them as pivoting stones to
continue the attack. A user can test and modify complex
scenarios, with several interconnected networks, where the
attacker has no initial connectivity with the objective of the
attack.
We give a concise description of this new technology, and its
possible uses in the security research field, such as pentest-
ing training, study of the impact of 0-days vulnerabilities,
evaluation of security countermeasures, and risk assessment
tool.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.6.7 [Simulation Support Systems]; I.6.3 [Simulation
and modeling]: Applications
General Terms
Security, Experimentation
Keywords
network security, network simulation, penetration test, vul-
nerability, exploit, 0-day, cyber-attack, training
1. INTRODUCTION
Computer security has become a necessity in most of today’s
computer uses and practices, however it is a wide topic and
security issues can arise from almost everywhere: binary
flaws (e.g., buffer overflows [17]), Web flaws (e.g., SQL in-
jection, remote file inclusion), protocol flaws (e.g., TCP/IP
flaws [3]), not to mention hardware, human, cryptographic
and other well known flaws.
Although it may seem obvious, it is useless to secure a net-
work with a hundred firewalls if the computers behind it are
vulnerable to client-side attacks. The protection provided
by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is worthless against
new vulnerabilities and 0-day attacks. As networks have
grown in size, they implement a wider variety of more com-
plex configurations and include new devices (e.g. embedded
devices) and technologies. This has created new flows of in-
formation and control, and therefore new attack vectors. As
a result, the job of both black hat and white hat communi-
ties has become more difficult and challenging.
The previous examples are just the tip of the iceberg, com-
puter security is a complex field and it has to be approached
with a global view, considering the whole picture simultane-
ously: network devices, hardware devices, software applica-
tions, protocols, users, etcetera. With that goal in mind,
we are going to introduce a new simulation platform called
Insight, which has been created to design and simulate cyber-
attacks against arbitrary target scenarios.
In practice, the simulation of complex networks requires to
resolve the tension between the scalability and accuracy of
the simulated subsystems, devices and data. This is a com-
plex issue, and to find a satisfying solution for this trade-off
we have adopted the following design restrictions:
1. Our goal is to have a simulator on a single desktop
computer, running hundreds of simulated machines,
with a simulated traffic realistic only from the attacker’s
standpoint.
2. Attacks within the simulator are not launched by real
attackers in the wild (e.g. script-kiddies, worms, black
hats). As a consequence, the simulation does not have
to handle exploiting details such as stack overflows or
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heap overflows. Instead, attacks are executed from an
attack framework by Insight users who know they are
playing in a simulated environment.
To demonstrate our approach, Insight introduces a platform
for executing attack experiments and tools for constructing
these attacks. By providing this ability, we show that its
users are able to design and adapt attack-related technolo-
gies, and have better tests to assess their quality. Attacks are
executed from an attack framework which includes many in-
formation gathering and exploitation modules. Modules can
be scripted, modified or even added.
One of the major Insight features is the capability to simulate
exploits. An exploit is a piece of code that attempts to
compromise a computer system via a specific vulnerability.
There are many ways to exploit security holes. If a computer
programmer makes a programming mistake in a computer
program, it is sometimes possible to circumvent security.
Some common exploiting techniques are stack exploits, heap
exploits, format string exploits, etc.
To simulate these techniques in detail is very expensive. The
main problem is to maintain the complete state (e.g., mem-
ory, stack, heap, CPU registers) for every simulated ma-
chine. From the attacker’s point of view, an exploit can be
modeled as a magic string sent to a target machine to un-
leash a hidden feature (e.g., reading files remotely) with a
probabilistic result. This is a lightweight approach, and we
have sacrificed some of the realism in order to support very
large and complex scenarios. For example, 1, 000 virtual
machines and network devices (e.g., hubs, switches, IDS,
firewalls) can be simulated on a single Windows desktop,
each one running their own simulated OS, applications, vul-
nerabilities and file systems. Certainly, taking into account
available technologies, it is not feasible to use a complete
virtualization server (e.g., VMware) running thousands of
images simultaneously.
As a result, the main design concept of our implementation
is to focus on the attacker’s point of view, and to simulate on
demand. In particular, the simulator only generates infor-
mation as requested by the attacker. By performing this on-
demand processing, the main performance bottleneck comes
from the ability of the attacker to request information from
the scenario. Therefore, it is not necessary, for example,
to simulate the complete TCP/IP packet traffic over the
network if nobody is requesting that information. A more
lightweight approach is to send data between network sock-
ets writing in the memory address space of the peer socket,
and leaving the full packet simulation as an option.
2. BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
Using simulated networks as a research tool to gather knowl-
edge regarding the techniques, strategy and procedures of
the black hat community is not a new issue. Solutions such
as honeypots and honeynets [20, 25] were primarily designed
to attract malicious network activities and to collect data.
A precise definition for the term honeypot is given by The
Honeynet Project [19]:
A honeypot is an information system resource
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of
that resource.
Over the last decade a wide variety of honeypot systems
were built [15, 2, 24, 28, 21], both academic and commercial.
Honeypots have emerged as an interesting tool for gather-
ing knowledge on new methods used by attackers, and the
underlying strength of the approach lies in its simplicity.
Typically, honeypots offer minimal interaction with the at-
tacker, emulating only small portions of a real network be-
havior. However, this simplicity is also a weakness: none
of these systems execute kernel or application code that at-
tackers seek to compromise, and only a few ones maintain
a per-flow and per-protocol state to allow richer emulation
capabilities. Thus, honeypots are most useful for capturing
indiscriminate or large-scale attacks, such as worms, viruses
or botnets, rather than very focused intrusions targeting a
particular host [26].
In Table 1 we show the main differences with our approach.
In particular, we are interested in the ability to compromise
machines, and use them as pivoting stones1 to build complex
multi-step attacks.
Honeypots-like tools Insight
Design focus: to detect,
understand and monitor
real cyber-attacks.
Design focus: to reproduce
or mimic cyber-attacks,
penetration test training,
what-if and 0-day scenar-
ios.
Attacks are launched by
real attackers: worms, bot-
nets, script-kiddies, black-
hats.
Attacks are launched by
the Insight users: pentest
and forensic auditors, secu-
rity researchers.
Simulation up to transport
layer.
Simulation up to applica-
tion layer, including vul-
nerabilities and exploits.
Stateless or (a kind of)
per-flow and per-protocol
state.
Applications and machines
internal state.
No exploit simulation. No
pivoting support.
Full exploit and agent
(shellcode) simulation.
Ability to pivot through a
chain of agents.
Table 1: Honeypots vs. Insight.
In contrast, “high interaction honeypots” and virtualization
technologies (e.g., VMware, Xen, Qemu) execute native sys-
tem and application code, but the price of this fidelity is
quite high. For example, the RINSE approach [13] is imple-
mented over the iSSFNet network simulator, which runs on
parallel machines to support real-time simulation of large-
scale networks. All these solutions share the same princi-
ple of simulating almost every aspect of a real machine or
real network, but share the similar problems too: expensive
configuration cost and expensive hardware and software li-
censes. Moreover, most of these solutions are not fully com-
patible with standard network protections (e.g., firewalls,
1 In a network attack, to pivot means to use a compromised
machine as a stepping stone to reach further networks and
machines, making use of its trust relationships.
IDSs), suffering a lack of integration between all security
actors in complex cyber-attack scenarios.
Security assessment and staging are other well known secu-
rity practices. It is common, for example in web application
development, to duplicate the production environment on a
staging environment (accurately mimicking or mirroring the
first) to anticipate changes and their impact. The downside
is: it is very difficult to adopt this approach in the case of
network security due to several reasons. It would require the
doubling of the hardware and software licenses and (among
other reasons) there are no means to automatically configure
the network.
Other interesting approaches to solve these problems include
the framework developed by Bye et al. [4]. While they focus
on distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) and defensive
IDS analysis, we focus on offensive strategies to understand
the scenarios and develop countermeasures. Also Loddo et
al. [14] have integrated User Mode Linux [9] and Virtual
Distributed Ethernet [8] to create a flexible and very detailed
network laboratory and simulation tool. The latter project
has privileged accuracy and virtualization over scalability
and performance.
The Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm [26] is another interest-
ing prototype. It improves high-fidelity honeypot scalability
by up to six times while still closely emulating the execu-
tion behavior of individual Internet hosts. Potemkin uses
quite sophisticated on-demand techniques for instantiating
hosts2, but this approach focuses on attracting real attacks
and it shows the same honeypot limitations to reach this
goal. As an example, to capture e-mail viruses, a honey-
pot must posses an e-mail address, must be scripted to read
mail (executing attachments like a naive user) and, most
critically, real e-mail users must be influenced to add the
honeypot to their address books. Passive malware (e.g.,
many spyware applications) may require a honeypot to gen-
erate explicit requests, and focused malware (e.g., targeting
only financial institutions) may carefully select its victims
and never touch a large-scale honeyfarm. In each of these
cases there are partial solutions, and they require careful
engineering to truly mimic the target environment.
In conclusion, new trends in network technologies make cyber-
attacks more difficult to understand, learn and reproduce,
and the current tools to tackle these problems have some
deficiencies when facing large complex scenarios. In spite of
that, it is possible to overcome the problems described above
using the lightweight software simulation tool we present.
3. INSIGHT APPROACH & OVERVIEW
A diagram of the Insight general architecture is showed in
Fig. 1. The Simulator subsystem is the main component.
It performs all simulation tasks on the simulated machines,
such as system call execution, memory management, inter-
rupts, device I/O management, etcetera.
At least one Simulator subsystem is required, but the archi-
tecture allows several ones, each running in a real computer
2Including copy-on-write file system optimizations imple-
mented also in Insight, as we are going to see it in §5.5.
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Figure 1: Insight architecture layout.
(e.g., a Windows desktop). In this example, there are two
simulation subsystems, but more could be added in order to
support more virtual hosts.
The simulation proceeds in a lightweight fashion. It means,
for example, that not all system calls for all OS are sup-
ported by the simulation. Instead of implementing the whole
universe of system calls, Insight handles a reduced and generic
set of system calls, shared by all the simulated OS. Using
this approach, a specific OS system call is mapped to an
Insight syscall which works similarly to the original one. For
example, the Windows sockets API is based on the Berkeley
sockets API model used in Berkeley UNIX, but both imple-
mentations are slightly different3. Similarly, there are some
instances where Insight sockets have to diverge from strict
adherence to the Berkeley conventions, usually due to im-
plementation difficulties in the simulated environment. In
spite of this (and ignoring the differences between OS), all
sockets system calls of the real world have been mapped to
this unique simulated API.
Of course, there are some system calls and management
tasks closely related to the underlying OS which were not
fully supported, such as UNIX fork and signal syscalls, or
the complete set of functions implemented by the Windows
SDK. There is a trade-off between precision and efficiency,
and the decision of which syscalls were implemented was
made with the objective of maintaining the precision of the
simulation from the attacker’s standpoint.
3For additional details look at the Winsock API documen-
tation (available from http://msdn.microsoft.com), which
includes a section called Porting Socket Applications to
Winsock.
The exploitation of binary vulnerabilities4 is simulated with
a probabilistic approach, keeping the attack model simple,
lightweight, and avoiding to track anomalous conditions (and
its countermeasures), such as buffer overflows, format string
vulnerabilities, exception handler overwriting—among other
well known vulnerabilities [1]. This probabilistic approach
allows us to mimic the unpredictable behavior when an ex-
ploit is launched against a targeted machine.
Let us assume that a simulated computer was initialized
with an underlying vulnerability (e.g. it hosts a vulnera-
ble OS). In this case, the exploit payload is replaced by a
special ID or “magic string”, which is sent to the attacked
application using a preexistent TCP communication chan-
nel. When the attacked application receives this ID, Insight
will decide if the exploit worked or not based on a probabil-
ity distribution that depends on the exploit and the prop-
erties describing the simulated computer (e.g., OS, patches,
open services). If the exploit is successful, then Insight will
grant the control in the target computer through the agent
abstraction, which will be described in §4.
The probabilistic attack model is implemented by the Simu-
lator subsystems, and it is supported by the Exploits Database,
a special configuration file which stores the information re-
lated to the vulnerabilities. This file has a XML tree struc-
ture, and each entry has the whole necessary information
needed by the simulator to compute the probabilistic be-
havior of a given simulated exploit. For example, a given
exploit succeeds against a clean XP SP2 with 83% proba-
bility if port 21 is open, but crashes the system if it is a
SP1. We are going to spend some time in the probability
distribution, how to populate the exploits database, and the
Insight attack model in the next sections.
Returning to the architecture layout showed in Fig. 1, all
simulator subsystems are coordinated by a unique Simulator
Monitor, which deals with management and administrative
operations, including administrative tasks (such as start-
ing/stopping a simulator instance) and providing statistical
information for the usage and performance of these.
A set of Configuration Files defines the snapshot of a virtual
Scenario. Similarly, a scenario snapshot defines the instanta-
neous status of the simulation, and involves a crowd of sim-
ulated actors: servers, workstations, applications, network
devices (e.g. firewalls, routers or hubs) and their present
status. Even users can be simulated using this approach,
and this is especially interesting in client-side attack sim-
ulation, where we expect some careless users opening our
poisoned crafted e-mails.
Finally, at the right bottom of the architecture diagram, we
can see the Penetration Testing Framework, an external sys-
tem which interacts with the simulated scenario in real time,
sending system call requests through a communication chan-
nel implemented by the simulator. This attack framework is
a free tailored version of the Impact solution5, however other
attack tools are planned to be supported in the future (e.g.,
4Insight supports simulation for binary vulnerabilities.
Other kind of vulnerabilities (e.g. client-side and SQL in-
jections) will be implemented in the future versions.
5Available from http://trials.coresecurity.com/.
Metasploit [16]).
The attacker actions are coded as Impact script files (us-
ing Python) called modules, which have been implemented
using the attack framework SDK, as shown in the archi-
tecture diagram. The framework Python modules include
several tools for common tasks (e.g. information gathering,
exploits, import scenarios). The attacks are executed in real
time against a given simulated scenario; a simulation compo-
nent can provide scenarios of thousands of computers with
arbitrary configurations and topologies. Insight users can de-
sign new scenarios and they have scripts to manage the cre-
ation and modifications for the simulated components, and
therefore iterate, import and reproduce cyber-attack exper-
iments.
4. THE SIMULATED ATTACKMODEL
One of the characteristics that distinguish the scenarios sim-
ulated by Insight is the ability to compromise machines, and
use them as pivoting stones to build complex multi-step at-
tacks. To compromise a machine means to install an agent
that will be able to execute arbitrary system calls (syscalls)
as a user of this system.
The agent architecture is based on the solution called syscall
proxy (see [5] for more details). The idea of syscall proxying
is to build a sort of universal payload that allows an attacker
to execute any system call on a compromised host. By in-
stalling a small payload (a thin syscall server) on a vulner-
able machine, the attacker will be able to execute complex
applications on his local host, with all system calls executed
remotely. This syscall server is called an agent.
In the Insight attack model, the use of syscall proxying intro-
duces two additional layers between a process run by the at-
tacker and the compromised OS. These layers are the syscall
client layer and the syscall server layer.
The syscall client layer runs on the attacker’s Penetration
Testing Framework. It acts as a link between the process
running on the attacker’s machine and the system services
on a remote host simulated by Insight. This layer is respon-
sible for forwarding each syscall argument and generating a
proper request that the agent can understand. It is also re-
sponsible for sending this request to the agent and sending
back the results to the calling process.
The syscall server layer (i.e. the agent that runs on the
simulated system) receives requests from the syscall client
to execute specific syscalls using the OS services. After the
syscall finishes, its results are marshalled and sent back to
the client.
4.1 Probabilistic exploits
In the simulator security model, a vulnerability is a mecha-
nism used to access an otherwise restricted communication
channel. In this model, a real exploit payload is replaced by
an ID or “magic string” which is sent to a simulated appli-
cation. If this application is defined to be vulnerable (and
some other requirements are fulfilled), then an agent will be
installed in the computer hosting the vulnerable application.
The simulated exploit payload includes the aforementioned
magic string. When the Simulator subsystem receives this in-
formation, it looks up for the string in the Exploits Database.
If it is found, then the simulator will decide if the exploit
worked or not and with what effect based on a probability
distribution that depends on the effective scenario informa-
tion of that computer and the specific exploit. Suppose, for
example, that the Penetration Testing Framework assumes
(wrongly) the attacked machine is a Red Hat Linux 8.0, but
that machine is indeed a Windows system. In this hypothet-
ical situation, the exploit would fail with 100% of probabil-
ity. On the other side, if the attacked machine is effectively
running an affected version of Red Hat Linux 9.0, then the
probability of success could be 75%, or as determined in the
exploit database.
4.2 Remote attack model overview
In Fig. 2 we can see the sequence of events which occurs
when an attacker launches a remote exploit against a simu-
lated machine. The rectangles in the top are the four prin-
cipal components involved: The Penetration Testing Frame-
work, the Simulator and the Exploits Database are the sub-
systems explained in Fig. 1; the Vulnerable Application is a
simulated application or service which is running inside an
Insight scenario and has an open port. In the diagram the
declared components are represented as named rectangles,
messages are represented as solid-line arrows, and time is
represented as a vertical progression.
Penetraton 
Testing 
Framework
Vulnerable 
Application
Simulator Exploit Database
execute syscall socket
syscall socket complete
execute syscall accept
syscall accept complete
connect incomming connection
accept connection
send data (exploit) execute syscall read
exploit detected
search exploit
exploit found
install new agent
syscall read complete
new agent deployed
Penetration
Tester
launch remote 
exploit
A simulated 
application opens a 
socket and waits for 
client connections
execute syscall listen
syscall listen complete
Figure 2: Remote attack model.
When an exploit is launched against a service running in a
simulated machine, a connection is established between the
Penetration Testing Framework and the service6. Then, the
simulated exploit payload is sent to the application. The tar-
geted application reads the payload by running the system
6This connection is established, for example, by a real Win-
dows socket or a simulated TCP/IP socket, see §5.2.
call read. Every time the syscall read is invoked, the Simula-
tor subsystem analyzes if a magic string is present in the data
which has just been read. When a magic string is detected,
the Simulator searches for it in the Exploits Database. If the
exploit is found, a new agent is installed in the compromised
machine.
The exploit payload also includes information of the OS that
the Penetration Testing Framework knows about the attacked
machine: OS version, system architecture, service packs,
etcetera. All this information is used to compute the proba-
bilistic function and allows the Simulator to decide whether
the exploit should succeed or not.
4.3 Local attack model overview
Insight can also simulate local attacks: If an attacker gains
control over a machine but does not have enough privileges
to complete a specific action, a local attack can deploy a
new agent with higher privileges.
Penetration 
Testing 
Framework
Installed Agent Simulator Exploit Database
write data (exploit)
exploit detected
search exploit
exploit found
install new agent
new agent deployed
Penetration
Tester
launch local 
exploit
To raise a local 
attack, an agent  
have to be 
previously installed 
in a remote 
application first.  
execute syscall write
syscall write complete
Figure 3: Local attack model.
In Fig. 3 we can see the sequence of events which occurs
when a local attack is launched against a given machine. A
running agent has to be present in the targeted machine in
order to launch a local exploit. All local simulated attacks
are executed by the Simulator subsystem identically: The
Penetration Testing Framework will write the exploit magic
string into the agent standard input, using the write system
call, and the Simulator will eventually detect the magic string
intercepting that system call.
In a similar way as the previous example, the exploit magic
string is searched in the database and a new agent (with
higher privileges) is installed with probabilistic chance.
5. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
One of the most challenging issues in the Insight architecture
is to resolve the tension between realism and performance.
The goal was to have a simulator on a single desktop com-
puter, running hundreds of simulated machines, with a sim-
ulated traffic realistic from a penetration test point of view.
But there is a trade-off between realism and performance
and we are going to discuss some of these problems and
other architecture details in the following sections.
5.1 The Insight development library
New applications can be developed for the simulation plat-
form using a minimal C standard library, a standardized
collection of header files and library routines used to imple-
ment common operations such as: input, output and string
handling in the C programming language.
This library—a partial libc—implements the most common
functions (e.g., read, write, open), allowing any developer
to implement his own services with the usual compilers and
development tools (e.g., gcc, g++, MS Visual Studio). For
example, a web server could be implemented, linked with
the provided libc and plugged within the Insight simulated
scenarios.
The provided libc supports the most common system calls,
but it is still incomplete and we were unable to compile
complex open source applications. In spite of this, some
services (e.g., a small DNS) and network tools (e.g., ipconfig,
netstat) have been included in the simulation platform, and
new system calls are planned to be supported in the future.
5.2 Simulating sockets
A hierarchy for file descriptors has been developed as shown
in Fig. 4. File descriptors can refer (but they are not limited)
to files, directories, sockets, or pipes. At the top of the hier-
archy, the tree root shows the descriptor object which typ-
ically provides the operations for reading and writing data,
closing and duplicating file descriptors, among other generic
system calls.
SocketReal
(IP Raw)
SocketReal
(UDP)
SocketDirect
(UDP)
Descriptor
PipeSocketFile
SocketRealSocketDirect
SocketDirect
(TCP)
SocketReal
(TCP)
Figure 4: Descriptors’ object hierarchy tree.
The simulated sockets implementation spans between two
kinds of supported sockets subclasses:
1. SocketDirect. This variety of sockets is optimized for
the simulation in one computer. Socket direct is fast:
as soon as a connection is established, the client keeps a
file descriptor pointing directly to the server’s descrip-
tor. Routing is only executed during the connection
and the protocol control blocks (PCBs) are created as
expected, but they are only used during connection es-
tablishment. Reading and writing operations between
direct sockets are carried out using shared memory.
Since both sockets can access the shared memory area
like regular working memory, this is a very fast way of
communication.
2. SocketReal. In some particular cases, we are interested
in having full socket functionality. For example, the
communication between Insight and the outside world
is made using real sockets. As a result, this socket
subclass wraps a real BSD socket of the underlying
OS.
Support for routing and state-less firewalling was also imple-
mented, supporting the simulating of attack payloads that
connect back to the attacker, accept connections from the
attacker or reuse the attack connection.
5.3 The exploits database
When an exploit is raised, Insight has to decide whether
the attack is successful or not depending on the environ-
ment conditions. For example, an exploit can require either
a specific service pack installed in the target machine to
be successful, or a specific library loaded in memory, or a
particular open port, among others requirements. All these
conditions vary over the time, and they are basically un-
predictable from the attacker’s standpoint. As a result, the
behavior of a given exploit has been modeled using a prob-
abilistic approach.
In order to determine the resulting behavior of the attack,
Insight uses the Exploits Database showed in the architecture
layout of Fig. 1. It has a XML tree structure. For example,
if an exploit succeeds against a clean XP professional SP2
with 83% probability, or crashes the machine with 0.05%
probability in other case; this could be expressed as follows:
<database>
<exploit id="sample exploit">
<requirement type="system">
<os arch="i386" name="windows" />
<win>XP</win>
<edition>professional</edition>
<servicepack>2</servicepack>
</requirement>
<results>
<agent chance="0.83" />
<crash chance="0.05" what="os" />
<reset chance="0.00" what="os" />
<crash chance="0.00" what="application" />
<reset chance="0.00" what="application" />
</results>
</exploit>
<exploit> ... </exploit>
<exploit> ... </exploit>
...
</database>
The conditions needed to install a new agent are described
in the requirements section. It is possible to use several
tags in this section, they specify the conditions which have
influence on the execution of the exploit (e.g., OS required,
a specific application running, an open port). The results
section is a list of the relevant probabilities. In order, these
are the chance of:
1. successfully installing an agent,
2. crashing the target machine,
3. resetting the target machine,
4. crashing the target application,
5. and the chance of resetting the target application.
To determine the result, we follow this procedure: processing
the lines in order, for each positive probability, choose a
random value between 0 and 1. If the value is smaller than
the chance attribute, the corresponding action is the result
of the exploit.
In this example, we draw a random number to see if an
agent is installed. If the value is smaller than 0.83, an agent
is installed and the execution of the exploit is finished. Oth-
erwise, we draw a second number to see if the OS crashes.
If the value is smaller than 0.05, the OS crashes and the
attacked machine becomes useless, otherwise there is no vis-
ible result. Other possible results could be: raising an IDS
alarm, writing some log in a network device (e.g. firewall,
IDS or router) or capturing a session id, cookie, credential
or password.
The exploits database allows us to model the probabilistic
behavior of any exploit from the attacker’s point of view,
but how do we populate our database? A paranoid approach
would be to assign a probability of success of 100% to every
exploit. In that way, we would consider the case where an
attacker can launch each exploit as many times as he wants,
and will finally compromise the target machine with 100%
probability (assuming the attack does not crash the system).
A more realistic approach is to use statistics from real net-
works. Currently we are using the framework presented by
Marcelo Picorelli [18] in order to populate the probabilities
in the exploits database. This framework was originally im-
plemented to assess and improve the quality of real exploits
in QA environments. It allows us to perform over 500 real
exploitation tests daily on several running configurations,
spanning different target operating systems with their own
setups and applications that add up to more than 160 OS
configurations. In this context, a given exploit is executed
against:
• All the available platforms
• All the available applications
All these tests are executed automatically using low end
hardware, VMware servers, OS images and snapshots. The
testing framework has been designed to improve testing time
and coverage, and we have modified it in order to collect sta-
tistical information of the exploitation test results.
5.4 Scheduler
The scheduler main task is to assign the CPU resources
to the different simulated actors (e.g. simulated machines
and process). The scheduling iterates over the hierarchy
machine-process-thread as a tree (like a depth-first search),
each machine running its processes in round-robin.
In a similar way, running a process is giving all its threads
the order to run until a system call is needed. Obviously,
depending on the state of each thread, they run, change
state or finish execution. The central issue is that threads
execute systems calls and then (if possible) continue their
activity until they finish or another system call is required.
Insight threads are simulated within real threads of the un-
derlying OS. Simulated machines and processes are all run-
ning within one or several working processes (running hun-
dreds of threads), and all of them are coordinated by a
unique scheduler process called the master process. Thanks
to this architecture, there is a very low loss of performance
due to context switching7.
5.5 File system
In order to handle thousand of files without wasting huge
disk space, the file system simulation is accomplished by
mounting shared file repositories. We are going to refer these
repositories as template file systems. For example, all sim-
ulated Windows XP systems could share a file repository
with the default installation provided by Microsoft. These
shared templates would have reading permission only. Thus,
if a virtual machine needs to read or change a file, it will be
copied within the local file system of the given machine.
This technique is well known as copy-on-write. The funda-
mental idea is allowing multiple callers asking for resources
which are initially indistinguishable, giving them pointers
to the same resource. This function can be maintained until
a caller tries to modify its copy of the resource, at which
point a true private copy is created to prevent the changes
from becoming visible to everyone else. All of this happens
transparently to the callers. The primary advantage is that
no private copy needs to be created if a caller never makes
any modification.
On the other hand, with the purpose of improving the simu-
lator’s performance, a file cache has been implemented: the
simulator saves the most recent accessed files (or block of
files) in memory. In high scale simulated scenarios, it is
very common to have several machines doing the same task
at (almost) the same time8. If the data requested by these
kind of tasks are in the file system cache, the whole sys-
tem performance would improve, because less disk accesses
will be required, even in scenarios of hundreds or thousands
simulated machines.
6. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To evaluate the performance of the simulator we run a test
including a scenario with an increasing number of complete
7Because descriptors and pointers remain valid when switch-
ing from one machine to the other.
8For example, when the simulation starts up, all UNIX ma-
chines would read the boot script from /etc/initd file.
LANs with 250 computers each, simultaneously emulated.
The tests only involves the execution of a network discovery
on the complete LANs through a TCP connection to port
80. An original pen-testing module used for information was
executed with no modifications, this was a design goal of
the simulator, to use real unmodified attack modules when
possible.
Performance of the simulator
LANs Computers Time (secs) Syscalls/sec
1 250 80 356
2 500 173 236
3 750 305 175
4 1000 479 139
Table 2: Evolution of the system performance as the
simulated scenario grows, running a network discov-
ery module, connecting to a predefined port. This
benchmark was run on a single Intel Pentium D
2.67Ghz, 1.43GB RAM.
We can observe the decrease of system calls processed per
second as we increase the number of simulated computer
as Insight was ran on a single real computer with limited re-
sources. Nevertheless, the simulation is efficient because sys-
tem calls are required on demand by the connections of the
module gathering the information of the networks through
TCP connections.
7. APPLICATIONS
We have created a playground to experiment with cyber-
attack scenarios which has several applications. The most
important are:
Data collection and visualization. Having the complete
network scenario in one computer allows an easy cap-
ture and log of system calls and network traffic. This
information is useful for analyzing and debugging real
pen-test tools and their behavior on complex scenar-
ios. Some efforts have been made to visualize attack
pivoting and network information gathering using the
platform presented.
Pentest training. Our simulation tool is already being used
in Pentest courses. It provides reproducible scenarios,
where students can practice the different steps of a
pentest: information gathering, attack and penetrate,
privilege escalation, local information gathering and
pivoting.
The simulation allows the student to grasp the essence
of pivoting. Setting up a real laboratory where pivot-
ing makes sense is an expensive task, whereas our tool
requires only one computer per student (and in case of
network / computer crash, the simulation environment
can be easily reset). Configuring new scenarios, with
more machines or more complex topologies, is easy as
a scenario wizard is provided.
In Pentest classes with Insight, the teacher can check
the logs to see if students used the right tools with the
correct parameters. He can test the students’ ability
to plan, see if they did not perform unnecessary ac-
tions. The teacher can also identify their weaknesses
as pentesters and plan new exercises to work on these.
The students can be evaluated: success, performance,
stealth and quality of reports can be measured.
Worm Spreading Analysis. The lightweight design of the
platform allows the simulation of socket/network be-
havior of thousands of computers gives a good frame-
work for research on worm infestation and spreading.
It should be possible to develop very accurate applica-
tions to mimic worm behavior using the Insight C pro-
gramming API. There are available abstract modeling
[7] or high-fidelity discrete event [27] studies but no
system call level recreation of attacks like we propose
in this future application of the platform.
Attack Planning. It can be used as a flexible environment
to develop and test attack planning algorithms used in
automated penetration testing based on attack graphs
[12].
Analysis of countermeasures. Duplication of the produc-
tion configuration on a simulated staging environment
accurately mimicking or mirroring the security aspects
of an organization’s network allows the anticipation of
software/hardware changes and their impact on secu-
rity. For example, you can answer questions like “Will
the network avoid attack vector A if firewall rule R is
added to the complex rule set S of firewall F?”
Impact of 0-day vulnerabilities. The simulator can be
used to study the impact of 0-days (vulnerabilities
that have not been publicly disclosed) in your network.
How is that possible? We do not know current 0-days...
but we can model the existence of 0-day vulnerabilities
based on statistics. In our security model, the specific
details of the vulnerability are not needed to study the
impact on the network, just that it may exist with a
measurable probability.
That information can be gathered from public vulner-
ability databases: the discovery date, exploit date, dis-
closure date and patch date are found in several public
databases of vulnerabilities and exploits [6, 23, 22, 11].
The risk of a 0-day vulnerability is given by the proba-
bility of an attacker discovering and exploiting it. Al-
though we do not have data about the security under-
ground, the probabilities given by public information
are a lower bound indicator.
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Figure 5: Probabilities before disclosure.
As shown in [10], the risk posed by a vulnerability
exists before the discovery date, augments as an exploit
is made available for the vulnerability, and when the
vulnerability is disclosed. The risk only diminishes as
a patch becomes available and users apply the patches
(and workarounds).
The probability of discovery, and the probability of an
exploit being developed, can be estimated as a func-
tion of the time before disclosure (see Fig. 5 taken from
[10]). For Microsoft products, we have visibility of up-
coming disclosures of vulnerabilities: every month (on
patch Tuesday) on average 9,40 patches are released
(high and medium risk), based on those dates we esti-
mate the probability that the vulnerabilities were dis-
covered and exploited during the months before dis-
closure.
8. CONCLUSION
We have created a playground to experiment with cyber-
attack scenarios. The framework is based on a probabilistic
attack model—that model is also used by attack planning
tools developed in our lab. By making use of the proxy
syscalls technology, and simulating multiplatform agents, we
were able to implement a simulation that is both realistic
and lightweight, allowing the simulation of networks with
thousands of hosts.
The framework provides a global view of the scenarios. It
is centered on the attacker’s point of view, and designed
to increase the size and complexity of simulated scenarios,
while remaining realistic for the attacker.
The value of this framework is given by its multiple appli-
cations:
• Evaluate network security
• Evaluate security countermeasures
• Anticipate the risk posed by 0-day vulnerabilities
• Pentest training
• Worm spreading analysis
• Systematic study of Planning techniques
• Data generation to test visualization techniques
If you are interested in using Insight, send us an email. We
are trying to build a community using it as common lan-
guage for discussing information security scenarios and prac-
tices, and will strongly support new applications of this tool.
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